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Abstract—As the popularity of software defined networks
(SDN) and OpenFlow increases, policy-driven network man-
agement has received more attention. Manual configuration of
multiple devices is being replaced by an automated approach
where a software-based, network-aware controller handles the
configuration of all network devices. Software applications run-
ning on top of the network controller provide an abstraction of
the topology and facilitate the task of operating the network.
We propose OpenSec, an OpenFlow-based security framework
that allows a network security operator to create and implement
security policies written in human-readable language. Using
OpenSec, the user can describe a flow in terms of OpenFlow
matching fields, define which security services must be applied
to that flow (deep packet inspection, intrusion detection, spam
detection, etc) and specify security levels that define how OpenSec
reacts if malicious traffic is detected. We implement OpenSec in
the GENI testbed to evaluate the flexibility, accuracy and scal-
ability of the framework. The experimental setup includes deep
packet inspection, intrusion detection and network quarantining
to secure a web server from network scanners. We achieve a
constant delay when reacting to security alerts and a detection
rate of 98%.
Index Terms—Software Defined Networking, OpenFlow, Net-
work Security
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of software-defined networks, efforts to
automate and simplify network operation have become popular
[1], [2], [3]. In SDN, the complexity of the network shifts
towards the controller and brings simplicity and abstraction
to the network operator. As we move away from manual
configuration at each device, we get closer to automated
implementation of network policies and rules. SDN decouples
the control plane from the data plane and migrates the former
to a logically centralized software-based network controller.
More complex network-control applications can thus be im-
plemented at the controller and exploit the fact that they are
network-wide aware due to the centralized nature of the control
plane.
OpenFlow is a protocol that standardizes how an SDN con-
troller communicates with the network devices. An OpenFlow-
compliant switch exposes to the controller an abstraction of
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its flow table and allows the controller to manipulate it by
inserting, modifying or deleting rules in the table. Using
OpenFlow, an application running on the network controller
can thus control how one or more layer 2 switches forward
incoming packets.
In this paper, we propose OpenSec, an OpenFlow-based
network security framework that allows operators to imple-
ment security policies across the network. Because OpenSec
provides an abstraction of the network, the operators can focus
on designing simple and human-readable security policies,
instead of on configuring all the devices to achieve the desired
security. OpenSec consists of a software layer running on top
of the network controller and multiple external devices that
perform security services (such as firewall, encryption, spam
detection, deep packet inspection (DPI) and others) and report
the results to the controller. The main goal of OpenSec is
to allow network operators to describe security policies for
specific flows. The policies include a description of the flow,
a list of security services that apply to the flow and how to
react in case malicious content is found. The reaction can be
to alert only, or to quarantine traffic and even to fully block
all packets from a specific source.
We have built OpenSec taking two design requirements
into consideration. First, policies should be human-readable.
Simplicity is one of the main goals of our framework and
although current work has focused on creating human-readable
policies [4], [2], [5], we argue that there is still room for
improvement. Second, the majority of the workload should
be done by the processing units. When the controller is
responsible for all tasks it becomes a bottleneck and the
solution does not scale well. In OpenSec, the controller is
subject to a low workload and is responsible of implementing
policies and modifying forwarding rules based on the security
alerts received from the processing units.
To evaluate the framework, we implement it on the GENI
testbed [6] using virtual nodes and Open vSwitch instances.
We implement two processing units that perform DPI and
intrusion detection and we evaluate the performance of using
different policies to secure a web server from a port scanner.
By combining both units, we achieve a detection rate of 98%978-1-4799-3512-3/14/$31.00 ©2014 IEEEGlobecom 2014 - Communication and Information System Security Symposium781
and a constant-time delay to react to security alerts issued by
the processing units.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows:
1) We create a simple, human-readable language to auto-
matically implement network security policies.
2) We give a first step towards automated, policy-based
reaction to security alerts using OpenFlow.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section
II we discuss required background on OpenFlow and related
work. In section III we describe OpenSec and in section IV
we evaluate the framework using a working prototype. Finally
we conclude in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND: SDN AND OPENFLOW
Software Defined Networking (SDN) consists of decou-
pling the control from the data plane. Forwarding devices
become simpler and transmit packets based on the forwarding
table, which is manipulated by a software-based, logically-
centralized network controller. SDN-based networks have sev-
eral capabilities that can be exploited in the context of network
security [7]. First, the controller is network-aware. This allows
it to gather information from multiple locations of the network
and to react accordingly. Second, SDN greatly simplifies
dynamic updating of traffic rules. Software running on the
controller can automatically modify the forwarding table of
any network device, based on the observation of current traffic.
OpenFlow [8] is the most commonly deployed SDN pro-
tocol. It standardizes the communication between a software-
based controller and layer 2 switches through the OpenFlow
channel. An OpenFlow-compliant switch exposes an abstrac-
tion of its forwarding table to the OpenFlow controller. The
controller can insert, delete or modify flows to the forwarding
table of any device. Each flow in the table consists of match
fields, an action (forward to a port, drop, translate VLAN tag,
etc.) and statistic data about the flow. When a packet received
by a switch does not match any rule, it is forwarded to the
controller. The controller can listen to incoming packets, push
outgoing packets and push new rules to the flow table of a
switch. OpenFlow 1.0 provides the following match fields:
ingress port, Ethernet source, destination and type, VLAN id,
VLAN priority, IP source, destination, protocol and ToS bits
and TCP/UDC source and destination.
Next we describe how OpenFlow has been used to enable
policy-based network administration and also how OpenFlow
has been use to provide network security.
A. Network policies using OpenFlow
Foster et al. [9] propose Frenetic, a programming language
to program OpenFlow-based networks. Frenetic provides an
interface to query traffic information and to react to network
events. Frenetic focuses on simplifying how to program net-
work events and how to retrieve traffic information. OpenSec
focuses on hiding such complexity and allowing a security
operator to work at a higher level. The goal of OpenSec is
to automate the implementation of security policies, not to
simplify the programming of the network.
More recently, Voelli et al. [4] proposed Procera, a “func-
tional reactive programming” framework where a user can
write a high-level policy to define how to handle network
events. Just like Frenetic, Procera also aims to simplifying
how to deal with network events. OpenSec also relies on
defining network policies, but we focus more on implementing
the policy and reacting automatically, instead of providing a
network-programming interface to the user.
B. Network security using OpenFlow
Shin et al. [5] propose CloudWatcher, a security monitoring
framework for the cloud that has several similarities with our
work. Using CloudWatcher, a network operator can use a
policy to describe a flow and describe which security services
must be applied it. The authors focus on routing algorithms to
locate processing units. Cloudwatcher focuses more on routing
algorithms to locate the processing units, while we focus more
on the high-level policies and automated reaction.
FRESCO [10] is another OpenFlow-based security frame-
work that exposes security modules to external users, who can
in turn define security polices using such modules. The main
difference between FRESCO and OpenSec is that FRESCO
performs all the security processing in the controller, whereas
OpenSec uses external processing units that send information
to the controller.
Although other studies have addressed policy-based network
administration using OpenFlow, as well as providing security
through SDN, OpenSec’s innovative approach allows opera-
tors to customize the security of the network using human-
readable policies and to customize how the controller reacts
automatically when malicious traffic is detected. We describe
our proposed framework in the following section.
III. THE OPENSEC FRAMEWORK
OpenSec aims at allowing network operators to create and
implement network security policies. The policies include a
description of the flow, a set of security services that must
be applied to such traffic and a security level for automatic
reaction in case of detecting malicious traffic. The processing
units provide specific security services such as encryption,
denial of service attack detection, deep packet inspection or
any other.
A. Policy parser
The policy parser converts the policy definition file into data
and structures that can be processed by OpenSec. Policies can
be defined using the keywords shown in Table I.
One of the main goals of OpenSec is to allow operators
to create very simple policies to control the network. Among
all related work, Procera is probably the one that has focused
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Fig. 1. The OpenSec framework.
TABLE I




















react if the service
reports malicious
content
most on designing human-readable policy specification.
However, we argue that understanding a definition written
in Procera is not straightforward. The following instructions
define a rule that allows all traffic:
proc world → do; returnA: λ req → allow
This statement still contains symbols that make it complicated
to read. Instead, we aim at statements such as:
Flow: VLAN=192; Service: DPI; React: alert-only
Procera relies on reactive programming and its goal is
different from OpenSec. In Procera, the goal is to program
the network using policies and this includes handling events
generated by the switches. OpenSec does not communicate the
network events to the end-user. Instead, they are automatically
processed. This allows us to use a much simpler syntax to
describe the flow, identify one or more services and specify
how to react when malicious traffic is detected.
B. Policy checker
The policy checker maintains information about all policies
currently enforced and checks that new policies do not conflict
with existing ones. For example, if two policies use exactly
the same matching fields and the same values, implementing
such policy will not work, since one of the two matches will
occur first. By keeping a reference to all policy objects in the
system, the checker can easily compare incoming policies with
existing ones to verify this.
C. Processing units manager
In earlier work [3] we described how specialized network
hardware (commonly known as middleboxes) should not be
located in choke points of the topology, traversed by all traffic.
Instead, these devices should be located outside of the main
path and should act as security processing units that are visited
only by the traffic that needs to be processed. Using a smarter
OpenFlow-based control plane, the network can dynamically
create rules to re-route traffic only when necessary. In Fig. 1,
note that the main path is between the LAN and the WAN and
there are only simple, OpenFlow-compliant switches on that
path. This is important in terms of performance and reliability,
since a L2 switch is easier to maintain, upgrade or replace
in comparison to specialized hardware. When a specific flow
is subject to deep packet inspection, for example, then the
controller adds a rule that forces such traffic to visit the DPI
processing unit.
TABLE II









DPI 1 25 26
DDoS 2 48 49
Encrypt 3 25 26
In order for this architecture to function, all processing units
must register with OpenSec. The processing units manager
collects all the registrations and ends up with a list of services
and the location in the network where they can be found. In
our current implementation, the controller maps a service id
(DPI, IPS) to a switchID, an input port and an output port.
This is all the data needed by OpenSec to manipulate the flow
table of the devices in order to re-route traffic to the processing
units.
D. Policy implementer
Implementing a policy implies re-routing matching traffic to
one or more security processing units. In our current imple-
mentation, OpenSec first queries the processing units manager
for the switch id where the processing unit is connected. In
that switch, a rule is pushed to duplicate traffic so that a copy
is sent to the input interface of the processing unit for further
processing.
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Our current implementation assumes that rules to forward
traffic from the source to the destination already exist. There-
fore, OpenSec queries the flow table of the device attached
to a security service unit and finds the rule that matches the
description of the flow. Finally, that flow is updated as needed.
E. Security event processor
One of the most important features of OpenSec is the auto-
matic reaction to security alerts. Usually, a network operator
will react to an alert by either ignoring it or blocking the source
of the suspicious traffic. In OpenSec, the network operator
can define such a reaction in advance using three possible
solutions: alert, quarantine or block.
To allow OpenSec to scale better, the processing units are
responsible for analyzing the traffic and detecting malicious
flows. Sampling traffic at the controller increases the chances
of having a bottleneck and increases the complexity. Also,
the connectivity between switches and controller is usually of
low bandwidth, since it is the control plane. In contrast, the
data plane allows a faster bit rate and the processing units
are optimized to handle big flows. In OpenSec, the controller
remains listening to alerts and reacts to those alerts by deciding
how to modify the traffic rules.
If the specified reaction is alert, forwarding rules are not
modified and the network administrator is notified by e-mail.
To quarantine traffic, a processing unit logging all traffic is at-
tached to one of the switches. OpenSec updates the forwarding
table of the switch so that matching traffic is forwarded to the
quarantine unit instead of to the host. The quarantine unit logs
all incoming traffic so that a network operator can then analyze
the data. Finally, if the policy requires blocking all traffic, then
the forwarding rules of involved switches are modified so that
matching traffic is dropped.
To summarize this section, we provide a step-by-step exam-
ple of how an operator can implement a policy using OpenSec.
F. Step-by-step example
Suppose that we implement the following policy using the




To implement the policy:
1) A network admin should write the policy in a file (in
our current implementation, OpenSec will read policies
from a given folder).
2) OpenSec parses the policy and locates the switch where
the DPI unit is connected, as well as the interface (switch
1, port 25 as shown in Table II).
3) OpenSec assumes that there one or more rules already
exist so that traffic from VLAN 192 can go through the
network.
4) OpenSec finds the rule in switch 1 that matches packets
tagged with VLAN 192.
5) OpenSec modifies the rule so that traffic is forwarded
as specified by the original rule, but also forwarded to
port 25.
The processing unit can be implemented in any way, as long
as it is capable of registering with the controller and issuing
alerts. The reaction to an alert issued by the processing unit
is completely automatic and needs no intervention from the
network operator.
1) The processing unit detects malicious traffic and sends
a notification to the controller, with a description of the
flow.
2) OpenSec finds the match that corresponds to the de-
scription provided by unit and locates the corresponding
policy.
3) Because the policy specifies that traffic should be
blocked, the flow rule that was originally modified is
updated to drop all packets.
Next we describe evaluation results. We implemented
OpenSec in the GENI testbed to evaluate the scalability,
flexibility and accuracy of the framework.
IV. EVALUATION
Fig. 2. Sample topology with DPI and quarantining.
In Fig. 2, a testing client is connected to a web server
through two Open vSwitch nodes. The goal of the experiment
is protect the web server from port scanners. The experimental
setup consists of sending malicious and normal traffic to the
web server. Normal traffic is created by replaying commonly
browsing requests such as video streaming, web requests and
file downloads. A total of 20,000 packets are used. Malicious
traffic is generated using nmap [11], a port scanning tool.
Specifically, we run the following attacks: SYN stealth scan,
Xmas tree scan, ping scan, UDP scan and TCP scan [12].
These scans send 2,000 packets each and scan multiple ports
to explore which protocols are exposed to the network. In this
secion we discuss how OpenFlow can be used to protect the
web server from these scans.
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A. Deep packet inspection on all incoming packets
First, we experiment using a broad policy that sends all
incoming traffic to a deep packet inspection unit. The policy
is as follows:
Policy 1: Flow: inPort=1; Service: DPI; React: quarantine.
This policy ensures that all traffic coming through port 1 is
duplicated and sent to the DPI unit. It also specifies that, in
case of detecting malicious traffic, all source coming from the
suspected host should be sent to quarantine. The quarantine
unit listens to the network interface and records all contents,
so that traffic samples can be analyzed afterwards.
The DPI unit is connected to the right-most switch and the
quarantine unit is located to the left-most switch. Our DPI unit
is built on top of nDPI [13], an open source DPI tool. nDPI
supports all major networking protocols at any layer, such as
IPv4, IPv6, UDP, TCP, HTTP, DNS, SSH, SMTP, Flash and
many others. A complete list is availble at the website [13].
Using the nDPI library, we analyze traffic samples captures
using pcap every second. The implemented tool detects the
number of flows, the number of packets within a flow and the
application-layer protocol used by each flow.
The tool classifies traffic as malicious if: 1) the application-
layer protocol is unknown to nDPI, 2) there are more than five
flows with only one or two packets per flow and 3) if the same
source uses more than five different application-layer protocols
within a five seconds sample interval. If malicious traffic is
detected, the unit sends a simple message to the OpenFlow
controller containing the description of the flow. The controller
can then take action based on the reaction specified by the
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Fig. 3. Delay needed to quarantine traffic and number of packets that bypass
the quarantine.
OpenSec scales well because only the processing units
(instead of the controller) deal with the increasing amount of
traffic. In the DPI example, the processing unit is capable of
inspecting traffic at high bit rates, but the load at the controller
remains minimum. As shown in Fig. 3, the delay needed to
quarantine malicious traffic remains constant independently of
the number of packets per second. This delay remains constant
because it does not depend on the number of attacks detected
or the packet arrival rate. For every alert, the controller simply
finds the matching policy and modifies the traffic rules as
required. Also, if the capabilities of the processing units must
be improved, this task is independent of OpenSec and can be
performed without modifying the controller. As we discuss
in earlier work [3], this framework is easier to deploy in
comparison to when a middlebox is located in the main data
path.
Due to the fact that the delay remains constant, the number
of packets that bypass the quarantine unit grows linearly. Since
some time elapses between the detection of the scan and the
time when the flow rules are modified, a certain number of
packets are still forwarded to the web server instead of the
quarantine unit. This result is also shown in Fig. 3. The policy
deployed for this prototype works well to detect attacks that
are carried over multiple packets, such as a denial of service
attack. In such scenarios, reacting to the attack after a small
number of packets have reached the server is acceptable. If the
requirement is to detect smaller attacks that are carried over
a small number of packets (SQL injection, for example), then
a different policy can send all traffic to the unit and allow the
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Fig. 4. TCP throughput achieved using OpenSec and in-line DPI using a
10Mbps link.
C. Duplicating traffic or in-line DPI
One could argue that 50 packets bypassing the quarantine
is not fast enough. One way to solve this could be to use
a traditional approach where the DPI unit is traversed by
traffic, allowing the tool to drop packets in real time. However,
security middleboxes such as firewalls and DPI units are not
yet capable of dealing with big data flows without dropping
packets. Dart et al. [14] show the TCP throughput can be
reduced by a factor of 9 if a router is losing a ver small
percentage of traffic. To verify this, we simulated a DPI unit
that is traversed by all traffic and then sends all data back to the
main data path. We experimented with different percentages
of packet drops and Fig. 4 shows how this solution heavily
impacts the TCP throughput between the server and the client.
By duplicating the traffic, OpenSec increases the amount of
traffic, but also allows the data to traverse the network at a
faster rate.
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Fig. 6. Accuracy achieved by DPI and IDS together.
D. IDS processing for HTTP specific traffic
Figure 5 shows a high detection rate for nmap port scans
when policy 1 is used. Although our nDPI script is fairly
simple, it is highly accurate to detect port scans, since the
number of scanned ports increases almost immediately. How-
ever, when we add web scans to our experiment, we notice
that the detection rate is very low.
We use Arachni [15] to run the scans. The tool sends ap-
proximately 300 requests to commonly used resources within
the webserver searching for vulnerabilities and backdoors. As
shown in Fig. 5, the nDPI script has a very low detection
rate for this type of scan. This is expected because Arachni
sends all traffic through TCP/80 and nDPI does not have any
HTTP-specific capability to know that this is a scan.
Instead of increasing the complexity of the DPI unit (which
is not the goal of this paper), next we focus on showing how
OpenSec allows for a more flexible security management.
We add a second processing unit that uses Bro [16], an
open source intrusion detection system (IDS) tool. We create
a customized script in Bro to extract the URL from each
request and issue an alert if the same host queries more than
20 different URLs in less than a second. Using OpenSec, we
add the following policy to the previous one:
Policy 2: Flow: l4Port=80; Service: IDS; React: quarantine.
Figure 6 shows how the detection rate of web scans is
strongly increased. By simply adding a new policy that only
affects TCP/80 traffic, a detection rate of 98% is achieved..
The IDS script ignores all packets that are not HTTP content.
Therefore, in a larger network where web traffic is only a
portion of the load, policy 2 is useful to send only HTTP
traffic to the IDS unit instead of sending all the remaining
unnecessary data.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present OpenSec, an OpenFlow-based
framework that allows network operators to describe security
policies using human-readable language and to implement
them across the network. OpenSec acts as a virtual layer
between the user and the complexity of the OpenFlow con-
troller and automatically converts security policies into a set
of rules that are pushed into network devices. OpenSec also
allows network operators to specify how to automatically react
in case of detecting malicious traffic. OpenSec is the allows
for automated reaction to security alerts based on pre-defined
network policies. By doing so, it contributes to hiding the
complexity of the network to security operators, who only
need to focus on defining the policies.
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